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Medical decisionmaking in pediatrics is characterized by three features: a
refutable presumption of parental decisionmaking authority, the use of the
best interests standard, and the increasing participation of children in
decisionmaking as developmentally appropriate. 1 Children generally lack an
adult's level of self-determination and their parents or guardians are
responsible for their well-being. The presumption that parents or guardians,
as opposed to the state, bear primary responsibility for children is justified by
both philosophical reasons and social convention. Justifications include
families generally know children better and are better positioned to make
decisions on their behalf, as well as families typically bear the burdens of
decisionmaking and therefore should have freedom to make them. 2
The standard of parental medical decisionmaking is typically
characterized as the "best interests" standard. 3 This standard focuses
attention on the child's rather than the parents' or the family's interests. The
presumption favoring parental decisionmaking may be overcome in
situations in which parents themselves lack decisionmaking capacity or act
contrary to their children's best interests. The standards for judicial
intervention in cases of medical neglect generally include the imminent risk
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Center, Salt Lake City, UT. He holds an M.D. from Washington University School of
Medicine and Ph.D. in Religious Ethics from University of Chicago Divinity School.
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I RICHARD B. MILLER, CHILDREN, ETHICS, AND MODERN MEDICINE 13, n.4 (2003).
2 Id. at 38-40. See also Douglas S. Diekema, Parental Refusals of Medical
Treatment: The Harm Principle as Threshold for State Intervention, 25 THEOR. MED.
BIOETH. 243, 244 (2004); Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial
Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 266-68
(1975).
3 See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS 102 (5th ed. 2001).
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of death or serious disability that can be prevented with a high likelihood of
success by a discrete intervention. The classic example is transfusing the
child of Jehovah's Witness parents who has suffered significant blood loss. 4
While young children lack self-determination, children's development of
self-determination should be recognized and respected. Children begin to
develop the knowledge, intelligence, and voluntariness necessary for
competence at thirteen to fourteen years of age and their consent should be
sought. Absent the capacity to consent, children should still participate in
medical decisionmaking as appropriate. The goals of participation include
instructing children in self-care and cultivating children's responsibility for
health care.5 States have different regulatory regimes for emancipating
minors or granting them authority to make particular types of medical
decisions, such as those related to reproduction. 6
This model contrasts with medical decisionmaking in adults. Competent
adults have the right to refuse medical treatment. If they lack decisionmaking
capacity, a surrogate makes decisions on their behalf according to the
"substituted judgment" standard. Proxies should make decisions based on
what the individual would have wanted. 7 Mechanisms, such as durable
powers of attorney for healthcare and living wills, exist to facilitate the
identification of proxies and to guide decisionmaking. 8 If the adult never had
capacity or his wishes are unclear, decisions should be made on the basis of
the best interests standard. 9
Uncertainty or conflict in medical decisionmaking has been addressed
through ethics consultation. Ethics consultation is "a service provided by an
individual or group to help patients, families, surrogates, health care
providers, or other involved parties address uncertainty or conflict regarding
4 See id. at 314; Diekema, supra note 2, at 245-49.
5 See American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Bioethics, Informed Consent,
Parental Permission, and Assent in Pediatric Practice, 95 PEDIATRICS 314 (1995);
MILLER, supra note 1, at 71-81.
6 See Angela R. Holder, Minors' Rights to Consent to Medical Care, 257 JAMA
3400, 3400 (1987); Garry S. Sigman & Carolyn O'Connor, Exploration for Physicians of
the Mature Minor Doctrine, 119 J. PEDIATR. 520, 521-22 (1991).
7 See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 99-100.
8 See id. at 152-54.
9 See id. at 98-103. See also Lynne Sims-Taylor, Reasoned Compassion in a More
Humane Forum: A Proposal to Use ADR to Resolve Medical Treatment Decisions, 9
OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 333, 345-49 (1993-94); Michele Yeun, Letting Daddy Die:
Adopting New Standards for Surrogate Decisionmaking, 39 UCLA L. REv. 581, 595-600
(1991-92).
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value-laden issues that emerge in healthcare."' 10 Ethics consultation
developed concurrently with ethics committees but is not identical with their
development. Ethics committees are multidisciplinary institutional
committees with several functions including education, policy development
or review, and ethics consultation or review of consultation.lI Consultation
can be performed by ethics committees, but may also be conducted by small
groups or individual consultants. In such cases, consultations are frequently
reviewed by the full committee. 12
While ethics committees were initially discussed in the 1970s, they were
not widely implemented until the mid-1980s. In 1972, the New Jersey
Supreme Court, citing an article by Dr. Karen Teel, recommended the
development of ethics committees. 13 A decade later, a study commissioned
by the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research found that only 4.3% of hospitals
with more than 200 beds had committees and 41% of the committees were in
the state of New Jersey. These committees reviewed an average of one case
per year. 14 The Commission itself endorsed ethics committees, 15
encouraging their development. In pediatrics, the Department of Health and
10 AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR BIOETHICS AND HUMANITIES, CORE COMPETENCIES FOR
HEALTH CARE ETHICS CONSULTATION 3 (1998) [hereinafter ASBH]. See also Mark P.
Aulisio, Robert M. Arnold, & Stuart J. Youngner, Health Care Ethics Consultation:
Nature, Goals, and Competencies. A Position Paper from the Society for Health and
Human Values-Society for Bioethics Consultation Task Force on Standards for Bioethics
Consultation, 133 ANN. INTERN. MED. 59 (2000) (distinguishing between clinical and
organizational ethics consultation and characterizing clinical ethics consultation as
focusing on issues in specific clinical cases and policies regarding patient care). In this
article, I focus on clinical ethics consultation in specific clinical cases.
11 See ASBH, supra note 10, at 1 (enumerating committee's functions as education,
research, policy development, and consultation); ALBERT R. JONSEN, THE BIRTH OF
BIOETHICS 364 (1998); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS
IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-
SUSTAINING TREATMENT: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN
TREATMENT DECISIONS 160-64, 440-41 (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
12 See ASBH, supra note 10, at 11-12; Cynda Rushton, Stuart J. Youngner, & Joy
Skeel, Models for Ethics Consultation: Individual, Team or Committee?, in ETHICS
CONSULTATION: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 88-95 (Mark P. Aulisio, Robert M. Arnold,
& Stuart J. Youngner eds., 2003).
13 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 668 (N.J. 1976) (quoting Karen Teel, The
Physician's Dilemma: A Doctor's View: What the Law Should Be, 27 BAYLOR L. REV.
809 (1975)). Although this committee was labeled an "ethics committee," its function
was to determine prognosis. E.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 11, at 162.
14 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 11, at 446-47.
15 See infra notes 139-47 and accompanying text.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Human Services' recommendation, following the so-called Baby Doe case, 16
that hospitals establish infant care review committees was particularly
influential. 17 Ethics committees proliferated in the mid-1980s.' 8 In 1992, the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations required
hospitals to have a mechanism to address ethical issues and provide
education. This requirement does not mandate ethics committees, but is
satisfied by them. 19 A recent study of a random sample of 600 U.S. general
hospitals found that 81% of all general hospitals and 100% of hospitals with
more than 400 beds had ethics consultation services. 20
There is significant debate regarding the method of ethics consultation
and the related issues of training and certification. 2 1 Regarding methodology,
a number of authors have suggested ethics consultation incorporate
alternative dispute resolution methods, principally mediation.22
16 See JONSEN, supra note 11, at 249 (describing the public and governmental
response to the death of an infant with Down syndrome and esophageal atresia after the
infant's parents refused permission for surgical correction of the esophageal
malformation).
17 See Child Abuse Amendments, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106 (1994). See also Ronald
E. Cranford & A. Edward Doudera, The Emergence of Institutional Ethics Committees, in
INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEES AND HEALTH CARE DECISION MAKING 5, 7-8
(Ronald E. Cranford & A. Edward Doudera eds., 1984); John J. Paris & Frank E.
Reardon, Ethics Committees in Critical Care, 2 CRIT. CARE CLIN. 111, 112-16 (1986);
Fred Rosner, Hospital Medical Ethics Committees: A Review of their Development, 253
JAMA 2693 (1985).
18 Ethics Committees Double Since '83: Survey, 59 HOSPITALS 60 (1985).
19 JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS, 1992
ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS (1992). See also JCAHO Spurs New
Committees and Educational Needs, 8 Hosp. ETHICS 7 (1992).
20 Ellen Fox, Sarah Myers, & Robert A. Pearlman, Ethics Consultation in United
States Hospitals: A National Survey, 7 AM. J. BIOETH. 13 (2007).
2 1See generally ETHICS CONSULTATION: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE (Mark P.
Aulisio, Robert M. Arnold, & Stuart J. Youngner eds., 2003).
22 See Erica Wood & Naomi Karp, "Fitting the Forum to the Fuss" in Acute and
Long-Term Care Facilities, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 621, 621 (1995) ("This article
profiles a number of forums for addressing disagreements in hospitals and nursing homes
in an effort to guide advocates to the right 'fit' and describes cutting-edge projects
demonstrating the use of mediation."). See generally Linda C. Fentiman, Privacy and
Personhood Revisited: A New Framework for Substitute Decisionmaking for the
Incompetent Incurably Ill Adult, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 801 (1988-89) (having
identified several ill effects of the autonomy model of substitute decisionmaking for
incompetent, incurably ill adults, the author advocates for a conversation model, with
sources including alternative dispute resolution, to account for autonomy as well as
privacy and community); Yeun, supra note 9 (arguing that families should be the default
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surrogate decisionmaker using the best interests standard unless the patient's wishes are
clearly discernable and contends that in cases of conflict between the family and
physicians, disagreements should be submitted to arbitration with a presumption of
continued treatment); Mary Beth West & Joan McIver Gibson, Facilitating Medical
Ethics Case Review: What Ethics Committees Can Learn from Mediation and
Facilitation Techniques, 1 CAMB. Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 63 (1992) (drawing parallels
between case consultation and mediation and facilitation and making recommendations
for conducting intake, consultation, and follow-up); Sims-Taylor, supra note 9 (arguing
in part for a graduated system within hospitals, involving informal and formal mediation
and mandatory non-binding arbitration prior to adjudication, to address disputes over
cessation of medical treatment for incompetent patients); NANCY NEVELOFF DUBLER &
LEONARD J. MARCUS, MEDIATING BIOETHICAL DISPUTES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (1994)
(arguing mediation is a useful tool to address bioethical disputes and describing
Montefiore Medical Center's Bioethics Mediation Project); Diane E. Hoffmann,
Mediating Life and Death Decisions, 36 ARIz. L. REV. 821 (1994); Erica Wood & Naomi
Karp, Mediation: Refraining Care Conflicts in Nursing Homes, 18 GENERATIONS 54
(1994) (arguing mediation can be effective in resolving complex care differences in
nursing homes, and describing a planned American Bar Association Commission on
Legal Problems of the Elderly mediation project to address healthcare disagreements in
nursing homes in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area); Karen A. Bulter, Harvesters:
Alternatives to Judicial Intervention in Medical Treatment Decisions, 1996 J. DISP.
RESOL. 191 (1996) (arguing for the advantages of hospital ethics committees using ADR
techniques, in contrast to judicial intervention, in deciding the treatment of patients who
lack decisionmaking capacity); Mileva Saulo & Robert J. Wagener, How Good Case
Managers Make Tough Choices: Ethics and Mediation, 2 J. CARE MANG. 8 (1996)
(arguing that case managers require the skills of ethical case analysis, values history
assessment, and mediation; and describing the mediation process using a case); Shoshana
K. Kehoe, Giving the Disabled and Terminally Ill a Voice: Mandating Mediation for All
Physician-Assisted Suicide, Withdrawal of Life Support, or Life-Sustaining Treatment
Requests, 20 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 373 (1998-99) (arguing that a combination of
mediation and restorative justice "Peacemaking Circles" is a means for protecting
vulnerable populations from being exploited by the legalization of deliberate methods of
terminating a patient's life such as physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia); Robert
Gatter, Unnecessary Adversaries at the End of Life: Mediating End-of-Life Treatment
Disputes to Prevent Erosion of Physician-Patient Relationships, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1091
(1999) (arguing mediation, rather than arbitration, is the most appropriate method for
resolving physician-patient end-of-life treatment disputes because mediation's focus on
facilitation and conciliation will protect the physician's and patient's relationship of trust);
Thomas L. Hafemeister, End-of-Life Decision Making, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, and
Preventive Law: Hierarchical v. Consensus-Based Decisionmaking Model, 41 ARz. L.
REV. 329 (1999) (arguing that a mediation-style consensus-based decisionmaking model
should be used in end-of-life decisionmaking to minimize anti-therapeutic effects and
avoid unnecessary judicial involvement); Kimberlee K. Kovach, Neonatology Life and
Death Decisions: Can Mediation Help?, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 251 (1999-2000) (arguing
that mediation may be helpful in the process of decisionmaking in the NICU for a variety
of reasons including its ability to assure equal participation, enhance communication, and
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In this article, I argue that mediation is the most appropriate ADR
method for ethics consultation in pediatrics based on the nature of ethical
expertise and the best interests standard. In Part I, I review the spectrum of
dispute resolution methods, including negotiation, mediation, arbitration,
litigation, and hybrid processes, emphasizing their discriminating features. I
emphasize that in mediation the parties are the principal decisionmakers and
the orientation is collaborative, while in arbitration the third party is the
decisionmaker and the process is adversarial. In Part II I examine the relative
benefits and detriments of these methods relative to parties' goals. In both
Parts I and II, I note the role of specialized knowledge, if any, in these
practices. In Part III, I examine ethics consultation in terms of these
alternative dispute resolution methods. I note that ethics committees and
consultation developed as an explicit alternative to judicial review. I also
argue that current methods for ethics consultation represent hybrid processes
but fail to adequately address the due process protections required by
adjudicatory processes or the alterations in the communication environment
which occur when mediation and arbitration are combined. Acknowledging
that individuals may weigh potential goals differently, I argue in Part IV that
if one adopts a model incorporating arbitration to promote efficiency and a
determinative outcome, one must implement certain minimum due process
protections. In Part V I argue that the limitations of ethical expertise and the
indeterminacy best interests standard make ethics consultation disanalogous
to arbitration. I therefore conclude that mediation is a more appropriate
model for ethics consultation.
I. DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTICES
Conflict management and resolution includes a spectrum of practices.
Christopher W. Moore, for example, divides this continuum into four main
categories: private decisionmaking by the parties, private third-party
decisionmaking, legal (public), authoritative third-party decisionmaking, and
extralegal coerced decisionmaking. 23 The primary practices on which I focus
include and consider parties' strong emotions); Glenn Cohen, Negotiating Death: ADR
and End of Life Decisionmaking, 9 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 253 (2004) (proposing a
design process, based in part on the regulatory negotiations literature, and sketching a
possible ADR model, which includes negotiation, bioethics mediation, ethics committee
arbitration, and litigation).
23 CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR
RESOLVING CONFLICT 7 (3rd rev. ed. 2003) (differentiating processes in terms of the use
of coercion by or on the disputing parties and the likelihood of a win-lose or either-or
outcome); ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
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are negotiation, mediation, arbitration, litigation, and hybrid processes. (See
Table 1.)
Negotiation Mediation Arbitration Litigation






Voluntary X X X
Substantive ? X
Knowledge
Table 1: Characteristics of Dispute Resolution Processes
Decisionmaking by the parties includes informal discussion and problem
solving, negotiation, and mediation. Negotiation is differentiated from
informal discussion and problem solving in terms of formality. Negotiation is
a temporary bargaining relationship. 24 Mediation is an extension of
negotiation and is frequently referred to as "mediated" or "facilitated"
negotiation. 25  Negotiation and mediation are distinguished by the
involvement of a neutral third party. 26 Mediation can be defined as "the
intervention in a negotiation or a conflict of an acceptable third party who
has limited or no authoritative decisionmaking power, who assists the
THE TRANSFORMATIVE MODEL FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION 19 (rev. ed. 2005) ("[T]he
mediation field is diverse and pluralistic."). I try to recognize this diversity by
highlighting areas of disagreement as appropriate. This does not, however, mean that
generalizations are not possible. See id. (contending that the dominant pattern of practice
focuses on getting settlements).
24 MOORE, supra note 23, at 6-8. See also Bruce Patton, Negotiation, in THE
HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 279 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds.,
2005) ("Negotiation can be defined as back-and-forth communication designed to reach
an agreement between two or more parties with some interests that are shared and others
that may conflict or simply be different.").
25 MOORE, supra note 23, at 8, 14. See also Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding
Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 13 (1996).
26 E.g., Ann L. Milne, Jay Folberg, & Peter Salem, The Evolution of Divorce and
Family Mediation: An Overview, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION: MODELS,
TECHNIQUES, AND APPLICATIONS 8 (Jay Folberg, Ann L. Milne, & Peter Salem eds.,
2005).
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involved parties to voluntarily reach a mutually acceptable settlement of the
issues in dispute."27 The third-party is generally not involved in the dispute
and the third party's participation must be acceptable to the involved parties.
The process is voluntary and the settlement must be mutually acceptable. 28 In
addition to addressing substantive issues, mediation may also address the
relationship between the parties. This may involve either strengthening or
terminating the relationship. 29
Various authors identify components or stages of the mediation process
and skills used by mediators. In comparison to other dispute resolution
methods, the mediation process is relatively informal. Stages may include
opening remarks, information gathering, option generation, and negotiation.
The term "stages" is not intended to imply that every mediation includes each
of the stages or that one stage inevitably follows the next in a predefined
sequence. Mediation may also involve caucuses or private sessions with the
parties. Skills used by mediators include identifying interests, as opposed to
positions, reframing issues, and reality testing. 30
In terms of specialized knowledge, all mediators must be knowledgeable
about the mediation process, and in certain situations disputants may seek
mediators with specialized knowledge of the subject matter. 31 In the
27 MOORE, supra note 23, at 15. See also BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 23, at 8
("Across the mediation field, mediation is generally understood as an informal process in
which a neutral third party with no power to impose a resolution helps the disputing
parties try to reach a mutually acceptable settlement."); Kimberlee K. Kovach, Mediation,
in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 304 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C.
Bordone eds., 2005) ("Mediation is commonly defined as a process in which a third party
neutral, the mediator, assists disputing parties in reaching a mutually agreeable
resolution. Mediators aim to facilitate information exchange, promote understanding
among the parties, and encourage the exploration of creative solutions."); Riskin, supra
note 25, at 11 ("[Mediation is] a process in which an impartial third party, who lacks
authority to impose a solution, helps others resolve a dispute or plan a transaction.").
28 MOORE, supra note 23, at 15-16.
29 Id. at 15, 56. See also BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 23, at 218-2 1.
30 E.g., Kovach, supra note 27, at 308-09; MOORE, supra note 23, at 68-69; Ellen
A. Waldman, Identifying the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A Multiple Model
Approach, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 713-19 (1996-97). Interests are typically contrasted
with positions. Positions are the tangible outcomes discussed in a negotiation such as
money, goods, or time. Interests are the needs, desires, concerns, or fears that motivate
people to take particular positions. ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY, & BRUCE PATTON,
GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GivING IN 40-41 (2nd ed. 1991).
Reality testing involves asking the disputants questions that raise doubts about the
viability of potentially unrealistic or unimplementable agreements. E.g., MOORE, supra
note 23, at 330.
31 See Waldman, supra note 30, at 762-64.
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alternative dispute resolution (ADR) literature, a distinction is frequently
made between process and product or outcome. The mediator's domain is the
process. 32 Some authors suggest more specialized knowledge may be helpful
in particular contexts. Margaret L. Shaw, for example, argues that general
knowledge of the subject-matter is valuable for a variety of reasons,
including not only obviating the need to stop and ask for clarification, but
also to understand the implications of the communication and to raise
relevant questions. Technical expertise may be relevant in particular cases to
promote facilitation, including when parties are unusually hostile or
passive. 33 While specialized knowledge may be helpful, expertise is
generally not required and is potentially seen as detrimental. 34
Private third-party decisionmaking includes both administrative
decisions and arbitration. Moore characterizes arbitration as "a voluntary
process in which people in conflict request the assistance of an impartial and
neutral third party to make a decision for them regarding contested issues." 35
Like mediation, arbitration is a voluntary process. While arbitration may be
required by a contract, it is nonetheless voluntary in the sense that one need
32E.g., Milne, Folberg, & Salem, supra note 26, at 14 ("The mediator is in charge of
the process, whereas the parties retain responsibility for the product."); Lela P. Love &
Kimberlee K. Kovach, ADR: An Eclectic Array of Processes, Rather Than One Eclectic
Process, 2000 J. DIsP. RESOL. 295, 303 (2000) ("[T]he mediator's expertise in these
matters of process."); Riskin, supra note 25, at 46-47 (distinguishing expertise in the
mediation process with expertise in the subject matter); Leonard L. Riskin,
Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New Grid System, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 26-28, 34-37 (2003-04).
33 Margaret L. Shaw, Mediator Qualifications: Report of a Symposium on Critical
Issues in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 125, 132-33 (1988-
89); See also Riskin, supra note 25, at 46-47; Kovach, supra note 22, at 288.
34 Riskin, supra note 25, at 47 ("In fact, too much subject-matter expertise could
incline some mediators toward a more evaluative role, thereby interfering with the
development of creative solutions.").
35 MOORE, supra note 23, at 9. See also ALAN MILES RUBEN, How ARBITRATION
WORKS 3 (5th ed. 2003) ("Arbitration, to use the words of one writer, is a simple
proceeding voluntarily chosen by parties who want a dispute determined by an impartial
judge of their own mutual selections, whose decision, based on the merits of the case,
they agree in advance to accept as final and binding."); Milne, Folberg, & Salem, supra
note 26, at 8 ("Mediation is not Arbitration. In arbitration, a designated third person holds
the responsibility for making a finding or providing a decision for the parties. In
mediation a neutral third party is used, but the parties do not authorize the mediator to
make decisions for them."); Sarah Rudolph Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Arbitration, in
THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 318 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone
eds., 2d ed. 2005) ("Arbitration is a process by which a private third-party neutral renders
a binding determination of an issue in dispute.").
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not enter into the contract. Agreements to arbitrate can be invalidated if they
are part of a take-it-or-leave-it agreement. 36
Like mediators, arbitrators are the third parties who are outside the
conflict relationship. 37 Arbitration may be performed by either a single
person or a panel, typically of three individuals. Parties may select arbitrators
before or after a dispute arises and arbitrators may be selected on an ad hoc
or permanent basis. If there is no prior agreement, arbitration-sponsoring
organizations may assist the parties by providing a list of potential
arbitrators. There are two common methods of selecting an arbitration panel.
The first involve each party striking individuals from the list and rank
ordering the remainder. The highest-ranked, mutually acceptable candidates
are chosen. Alternatively, each party may select one arbitrator and these two
then select a third, neutral arbitrator. Default procedures, to be used if the
parties cannot agree within a specified time frame, are frequently included in
arbitration agreements. 38
Unlike mediators, arbitrators have decisionmaking authority. Sarah
Rudolph Cole and Kristen M. Blankley, for example, state, "Unlike
mediation, however, arbitration is an adjudicative process. The arbitrator,
like a judge, renders a decision based on the merits of the case." 39 Decisions
are typically rule-governed and generally follow the law of the jurisdiction
chosen by the parties or the collective bargaining agreement. 40 Decisions are,
however, not narrowly constrained by the law and are not reversible on the
basis of an error of fact or law. 41 Awards may, but need not, contain the
reasons justifying the award. 42 Arbitrators' decisions may be advisory or
binding. 43
The arbitration process is more formal than mediation and less formal
than litigation. For example, there may be an expedited discovery process,
including subpoenas. The formal codes of civil procedure or evidence are
not, however, adhered to.44 Like mediation, hearings are confidential. They
usually begin with the arbitrator's, then the disputants' opening statements.
3 6 E.g., STEVEN C. BENNETr, ARBITRATION: ESSENTIAL CONCEPTs 59, 70-72 (2002).
37 E.g., RUBEN, supra note 35, at 142.
38 E.g., BENNETT, supra note 36, at 49-50, 79-80, 99-100; Cole & Blankley, supra
note 35, at 326; RUBEN, supra note 35, at 171-75.
39 Cole & Blankley, supra note 35, at 319.
40 BENNETT, supra note 36, at 80-81; RUBEN, supra note 35, at 402-44, 1351.
41 BENNETT, supra note 36, at 68-69, 80, 124; RUBEN, supra note 35, at 34, 489-96.
42 BENNETT, supra note 36, at 54-55; Cole & Blankley, supra note 35, at 327.
43 MOORE, supra note 23, at 9.
44 BENNETT, supra note 36, at 52-53; RUBEN, supra note 35, at 341-42, 355-62.
[Vol. 23:1 20071
ETHICAL EXPERTISE AND BEST INTERESTS FAVOR MEDIATION
Witnesses and evidence are presented and the arbitrator may ask clarifying
questions.45 The rules of most arbitration-sponsoring organizations preclude
ex parte communication. 46 Hearings are open sessions and briefs and
correspondence are copied to the other party. It is believed that the process is
tainted when only one side is heard and the other party cannot confront the
submissions and arguments. 47 The parties typically make closing statements
and may submit posthearing briefs.48 Arbitrators' skills include the ability to
evaluate evidence and witnesses and to write findings. 49
Qualifications for an arbitrator may include subject expertise. General
qualifications may include knowledge of industrial matters or the law. 50 If a
technical matter is involved, having an expert may be desirable. Expertise
may include knowledge of custom or practice in an industry or knowledge of
the history of the parties' relationship. Expertise may, however, conflict with
impartiality particularly when expertise is developed by working in the
industry and developing relationships with its members. 51
While many authors distinguish mediation and arbitration in terms of
whether the neutral has decisionmaking authority, 52 there is significant
disagreement within the ADR community over whether mediators should
evaluate and how evaluative mediation differs from arbitration. A nidus for
this debate is Leonard Riskin's attempt to provide a system for categorizing
and understanding approaches to mediation. He proposes a system
characterizing the goals of the mediation or the scope of the problem(s) and
45 Cole & Blankley, supra note 35, at 319.
46 BENNETT, supra note 36, at 106-07; Thomas J. Brewer & Lawrence R. Mills,
Med Arb: Combining Mediation and Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 1999, at 32, 35;
Cole & Blankley, supra note 35, at 330-31.
47 BENNETT, supra note 36, at 180. But see, RUBEN, supra note 35, at 363-65.
48 Cole & Blankley, supra note 35, at 319.
49E.g., Fed. Mediation and Conciliation Serv., Becoming an FCMS Arbitrator,
http://www.fmcs.gov/intemet/itemDetail.asp?categorylD=184&itemlD= 16436 (last
visited Sept. 15, 2007); Nicole Buonocore, Resurrecting a Dead Horse-Arbitrator
Certification as a Means to Achieve Diversity, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 483, 496-99
(1998-99).
50 American Arbitration Ass'n, Qualification Criteria for Admittance to the AAA
National Roster of Arbitrators and Mediators, http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4223 (last
visited Sept. 15, 2007); Fed. Mediation and Conciliation Serv., supra note 49.
51 BENNETT, supra note 36, at 80, 99-100, 109, 178; Cole & Blankley, supra note
35, at 318; RUBEN, supra note 35, at 143-44, 185-87.
52 MOORE, supra note 23, at 48-49. But cf id., supra note 23, at 51-52 (recognizing
that vested interest mediation, in which the mediator has procedural and substantive
interests in the outcome and advocates for the mediator's own interests, fits uneasily
within his definition of mediation).
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activities or role of the mediator along continuums which he combines into a
four-quadrant grid. 53 The later continuum's extremes are strategies and
techniques that facilitate the parties' negotiation and those that evaluate
matters important to the mediation.54 Facilitative activities allow the parties
to communicate with and understand one another while evaluative activities
intend to direct some or all of the outcomes of the mediation. According to
Riskin, evaluative mediators use techniques, also representing a continuum,
including assessing the strengths and weaknesses of each side, predicting the
outcomes, proposing agreement, or urging or pushing the parties to accept
settlement. He did not, however, address what differentiates mediation from,
for example, non-binding arbitration. 55
Riskin's proposal generated significant debate within the mediation
community. 56 Some authors, such as Lela P. Love, contend that evaluative
mediation is not mediation as it is properly understood. Practices she
considers evaluation include giving advice, making assessments, and stating
opinions. 57 Evaluative processes include litigation, "rent-a-judge" arbitration,
early neutral evaluation, and summary jury trial. She characterizes arbitration
as "a private, voluntary dispute resolution process in which the parties to a
dispute agree in writing to submit the dispute for resolution to a third-party
neutral chosen pursuant to the agreement of the parties." 58 She emphasizes
53 Riskin, supra note 25, at 25. See also Leonard L. Riskin, Mediator Orientations,
Strategies and Techniques, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 111, 111
(1994).
54 Riskin, supra note 25, at 17, 23-24. But cf. Riskin, supra note 32, at 11-20, 30-
33 (arguing that evaluation and facilitation are not alternatives or opposites. Many
mediators use both approaches, often in tandem. Emphasizing the centrality of party self-
determination, Riskin contends evaluation can foster, impair, or both foster and impair
self-determination. He recognizes that not all of the techniques he previously labeled
evaluation, particularly urging or pushing parties to accept settlement, belonged together.
He suggests replacing the language of evaluative and facillative with directive and
elicitive.).
55 Riskin, supra note 25, at 40. But cf. MOORE, supra note 23, at 55-56 (recognizing
mediators exercise varying degrees of directiveness or control relative to substantive
issues, the problem solving process, and the management of relationships. Moore does
not address when a high degree of directiveness violates the mediator's role, but only
contends that the process needs to be adapted to the needs of the parties.).
56 See also Riskin, supra note 32, at 4 n.5; Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love,
Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin's Grid, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71, 72 n.4
(1998).
57 Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 937, 938 (1996-97).
58 Id. at 943 n.33; Kovach & Love, supra note 56, at 90.
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that these processes are adversarial. 59 She contrasts this with mediation,
which she sees as collaborative 60 or as reorienting parties toward one
another.61 The contrast between adversarial and collaborative processes
correlates with differences in the neutral's role. In adversarial processes the
neutral applies rules to facts and offers an opinion 62 and in a collaborative
process the neutral facilitates the parties' evaluation and decisionmaking. 63
Love characterizes "evaluation" activities, such as challenging proposals that
might derail the negotiation or that seem unrealistic, as part of the mediator's
facilitative role. 64 As she understands it, their aim in mediation is, however,
to empower the parties. 65
The debate over facilitative and evaluative mediation suggests the
distinction between collaborative and adjudicative processes as an alternative
framing of the issue of decisionmaking authority. The debate also suggests
the difficulty in characterizing mediators' individual actions relative to these
distinctions.
Public, authoritative third-party decisionmaking includes both judicial
and legislative decisions. These processes differ from mediation and
59 Love & Kovach, supra note 32, at 306. See also Jeffrey R. Seul, Litigation as a
Dispute Resolution Alternative, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPuTE RESOLUTION 347-48
(Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005).
60 Love, supra note 57, at 940; Kovach & Love, supra note 56, at 92-93.
61 Id. at 92, 94. See also Gatter, supra note 22, at 1106; Jeffrey W. Stempel, The
Inevitability of the Eclectic: Liberating ADR from Ideology, 2000 J. DisP. RESOL. 247,
274; MEGAN ELIZABETH TELFORD, MED-ARB: A VIABLE DIsPUTE REsOLUTION
ALTERNATIVE 2 (2000).
62 Kovach & Love, supra note 56, at 73.
63 Id. at 74, 89. See also David C. Elliott, Med/Arb: Fraught with Danger or Ripe
with Opportunity?, 34 ALBERTA L. REV. 163, 179 (1995).
64 Kovach & Love, supra note 56, at 79.
65 Id. at 95. But cf Waldman, supra note 30 (identifying three models of mediation
based on their relationship to existing social and legal norms: norm-generating, norm-
educating, and norm-advocating mediation. In the norm-generating model the parties
negotiate without recourse to extrinsic norms. Id. at 708, 718. In the norm-educating
model the mediator informs the parties regarding social and legal norms to provide them
a baseline framework, but does not insist on their implementation. Id. at 730. And, in the
norm-advocating model the mediator insists on their incorporation. Id. at 745. She does
not, however, clearly distinguish mediation from arbitration. She simply states, "To
some, norm-advocating mediation is a contradiction in terms. Yet, its growing use is
undeniable." Id. at 753; see also id. at 755-56. Several of Waldman's examples of norm-
advocating mediation are in fact hybrid processes that incorporate consultation,
mediation, and arbitration or incorporate experts into the mediation process itself. Id. at
748-50.).
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arbitration because they are public. 66 Litigation differs from mediation and
arbitration because the plaintiff can compel the defendant's participation.
67
Like arbitration, the decisionmaker, a judge or jury, is impartial and neutral.
The decisionmaker, however, is usually required to make a decision
congruent with legislation and legal precedent. The outcome, once appeals
are completed, is binding and enforceable. 68 Courts can award three types of
relief in civil cases: money damages, equitable relief, and declaratory relief.
Courts, however, cannot compel unwilling parties to apologize or express
regret. 69
Litigation is a more formal process than either mediation or arbitration.
The process begins when the plaintiff files a complaint with the court and
serves it on the defendant. 70 Courts only entertain disputes that can be
expressed in terms of legal rights or liabilities.71 The defendant must then
either answer the complaint or seek to have the lawsuit dismissed. 72 If the
lawsuit proceeds, pretrial activity may include gathering evidence,
identifying witnesses, and developing legal theories and trail strategies.
73
The gathering of evidence, called "discovery," is highly formalized.74 The
trial itself involves opening statements, presentation of each side's case
accompanied by cross-examination, and closing statements. 75 Only relevant
information admissible under rules of evidence can be introduced at trial.
76
The fact-finder renders a decision, which is potentially subject to appeal. 77
As ADR has developed, mixed or hybrid approaches have also been
proposed including early neutral evaluation and mediation-arbitration (med-
arb). In early neutral evaluation, the third-party evaluates each side's case and
the probable court outcome and then facilitates settlement discussions. It
66 MOORE, supra note 23, at 10.
67 Seul, supra note 59, at 338, 346.
68 MOORE, supra note 23, at 10. See also Mnookin, supra note 2, at 249-50.
69 Seul, supra note 59, at 343-44. Equitable relief, such as requiring a seller to
complete a real estate transaction, can be granted when money would not provide
adequate compensation. Id. Declaratory relief is a pronouncement by the court, such as
the meaning of a contract provision, in a contested matter. Id.
70 Id. at 338.
71 Id. at 340.
72 Id. at 338.
73 Seul, supra note 59, at 338-39.
7 4 Id. at 341.
75 Id. at 339.
7 6 Id. at 341.
77 Id. at 338-44.
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combines non-binding arbitration and mediation. 78 In med-arb the parties
submit the dispute to a mediator who has the authority to determine a binding
settlement of any unresolved issues. 79 A number of variations exist within
the general framework of med-arb. 80 While a single individual typically
serves both the roles of mediator and arbitrator, 81 different individuals may
play these roles, either sequentially or concurrently. 82 Another variation is in
terms of process. Mediation may occur after the arbitration but before the
decision is announced.83 Particular issues include when to shift from
mediation to arbitration and who has the authority to make this decision.84
Proponents of med-arb contend that knowing unresolved issues will be
arbitrated provides an incentive to mediate. 85 Critics of hybrid approaches
contend that knowing the mediator may eventually arbitrate modifies the
parties' behavior during the mediation phase. 86 Parties may be unwilling to
disclose information that they fear will disfavor them if mediation fails. They
may also frame their participation in terms of the potential arbitration,
seeking to put themselves in the best, and their opponents in the worst,
light.87 Alternatively, they may disclose information that may harm them
later. 88
In addition, there is the concern that private contact with the parties will
compromise the neutral's adjudicative role.8 9 While mediators may caucus
with the parties, arbitrators are typically prohibited from unilateral ex parte
78 Kovach & Love, supra note 56, at 73 n.9.
79 Barry C. Bartel, Note, Med-Arb as a Distinct Method of Dispute Resolution:
History, Analysis, and Potential, 27 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 661, 644-45 (1991); Karen L.
Henry, Note, Med-Arb: An Alternative to Interest Arbitration in the Resolution of
Contract Negotiation Disputes, 3 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 385, 386 (1988).
80 Elliott, supra note 63, at 175-79; TELFORD, supra note 61, at 2, 14-15.
81 Bartel, supra note 79, at 665-66.
82 Elliott, supra note 63, at 175, 178.
83 Bartel, supra note 79, at 668.
84 Id. at 683-84.
85 Henry, supra note 79, at 386, 390; TELFORD, supra note 61, at 3.
86 E.g., Kovach & Love, supra note 56, at 99 ("If the neutral assumes an evaluative
role or orientation, the parties' focus during the process shifts towards influencing the
neutral decisionmaker and away from crafting outcomes for themselves."). See also
TELFORD, supra note 61, at 4.
87 Kovach & Love, supra note 56, at 102.
88 Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE
L.J. 1545, 1597 (1984).
89 Bartel, supra note 79, at 679, 685-88; Henry, supra note 79, at 396-97; TELFORD,
supra note 61, at 4.
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contacts. 90 There is a concern that neutrals cannot disregard information that
they learn in caucus, which one party may consider confidential, or which the
other party may be unaware of and has not had the opportunity to confront. 91
Supporters of med-arb contend that the situation is not fundamentally
different from judges who must decide on the admissibility of evidence.
They argue this is one of the competencies of the neutral.92
Dispute resolution processes exist along a continuum without a single
discriminating feature. Differentiating features include whether a third party
is involved, who has decisionmaking authority, and what the nature of the
process is. For example, the process may be cooperative or adversarial. Some
of these features, particularly the distinctions between facilitation and
evaluation or cooperative and adversarial, are not dichotomous. The presence
of multiple differentiating features and the gradations within some of the
individual features makes distinguishing processes difficult. Expert
knowledge is also viewed differently, as a hindrance or as beneficial, in each
of these processes. This complexity increases when processes are combined
into various hybrids.
II. ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES
In broad terms, each of these methods of dispute resolution has its
strengths and weaknesses, and may be more or less appropriate for certain
types of conflicts. 93 Some typologies focus on types of cases or subject
matter of the dispute: labor, family, environmental, or commercial. Jeffrey
W. Stempel, for example, asserts that facilitative mediation is more
appropriate for family law matters (matters where parties have had a
significant past relationship, a current relationship, or future interactions) and
evaluative mediation in commercial matters (where there is no prior or
subsequent relationship and getting along is instrumental to optimal
90 See supra notes 30, 46-47 and accompanying text.
91 TELFORD, supra note 61, at 4.
92 1d. at5, 10-11.
93 Compare Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the
Fuss: A User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOTIATION J. 49
(1994), with Love & Kovac, supra note 32, at 300-01 ("The suggestion to prescribe
permissible or desirable mediator activities by dispute or case type seems both
unnecessary and counterproductive. Assuming, arguendo, that there may be a certain
case type which will be benefited most by evaluative services, then that case type will
logically choose neutral evaluators or arbitrators-or mediators who provide a mixed
process. However, experience indicates that mediation offers its unique benefits across all
case types.").
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monetary compromise). 94 Typologies are more appropriately focused on the
parties' goals or objectives. (See Table 2.) Once such goals are defined,
relevant elements in the dispute situation or context can then be identified. 95
It is important to recognize, however, that the disputants' goals may differ










Outcome _ _ _
Table 2: Advantages of Dispute Resolution Processes
Mediation has a number of benefits compared to other dispute resolution
processes. It potentially produces integrative outcomes that better satisfy
parties' needs. 97 A secondary benefit of this satisfaction is greater
compliance with agreements. 98 Mediation is also more rapid, and less
costly-both economically and emotionally.99 Kovach and Love summarize
mediation's benefits as "high level of party satisfaction with the process;
outcomes tailored to the unique characteristics and interests of the particular
94 Stempel, supra note 61, at 250-51, 285-90. One might argue instead that
evaluation is beneficial in cases when one's best alternative to a negotiated agreement is
conditioned by external standards such as tort claims.
95 Robert A. Baruch Bush, Defining Quality in Dispute Resolution: Taxonomies and
Anti-Taxonomies of Quality Arguments, 66 DENY. U. L. REv. 335, 346 (1988-89).
96 Sander & Goldberg, supra note 93, at 60-61.
97 Kovach, supra note 27, at 305; Milne, Folberg, & Salem, supra note 26, at 8;
Frank E.A. Sander & Lakasz Rozdeiczer, Matching Cases and Dispute Resolution
Procedures: Detailed Analysis Leading to a Mediation-Centered Approach, 11 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 12-14 (2006).
98 Kovach, supra note 27, at 305; Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Small
Claims Mediation in Maine: An Empirical Assessment, 33 ME. L. REv. 237, 261 (1981);
Milne, Folberg, & Salem, supra note 26, at 8.
99 Kovach, supra note 27, at 305; Sander & Goldberg, supra note 93, at 52-53.
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participants; and impressive levels of party compliance with self-created
outcomes." 1
00
Proponents of specific mediation methods differ in their characterization
of mediation's benefits. Robert A. Baruch Bush and Joseph P. Folger, for
example, argue that mediation is uniquely capable of generating
empowerment and recognition. 10 1 They characterize empowerment as the
restoration to individuals of a sense of their value and strength and their own
capacity to make decisions and handle life's problems 102 and recognition as
the evocation in individuals of acknowledgment, understanding, or empathy
for the situation and the views of the other. 103 These changes are seen to
result in changes in the quality of social interaction and society. Settlement is
not a primary goal, but a secondary effect. Folger and Bush argue that
conflict transformation is the most important benefit of mediation because it
is the most valuable of the possible benefits and mediation has the special
ability to achieve it. 104
Arbitration, it is argued, provides the determinative outcome of a judicial
process with increased flexibility and efficiency. 105 Steven C. Bennett lists a
number of reasons parties may choose to arbitrate: privacy, choice of
decisionmaker, flexible rules, reduced cost and time to decision, recovery of
costs, business-like atmosphere, finality and enforcement, and neutral
forum. 10 6  The ability to choose the decisionmaker is particularly
advantageous when specialized knowledge is sought. 107
Proponents of mediation and arbitration both claim that it contributes to
relationships, but characterize this contribution in different ways. Advocates
of mediation assert that it is capable of addressing relationship issues even if
this means dissolving the relationship.108 While some proponents of
arbitration advocate its use in conflicts where there is no necessity of a
100 Kovach & Love, supra note 56, at 98.
101 See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 23, at 8-9 (identifying other accounts of
mediation, each with its own conception of benefit: reducing court congestions and
providing "higher-quality" justice, organizing people and communities to obtain fairer
treatment, and covertly achieving social control and oppression).
102 Id. at 22.
103 Id. at 13-14, 18.
104 Id. at 35.
105 Henry, supra note 79, at 389; Kovach & Love, supra note 56, at 90; MOORE,
supra note 23, at 9.
106 BENNETr, supra note 36, at 6-8.
107 Id. at 6; RUBEN, supra note 35, at 11.
108 MooRE, supra note 23, at 15; See also Stempel, supra note 61, at 285-90.
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continued relationship, 10 9 others emphasize arbitration's contribution to
maintaining relationships. Bennett notes that arbitration functions in the labor
context as a means to provide a swift resolution as an alternative to a strike or
litigation in a continuing relationship. 110 These characterizations differ in
terms of whether the conflict is constitutive of or secondary to the parities'
identities or relationship.
Critics of ADR have articulated related benefits of adjudication: the
production of just outcomes, protection of weaker parties, and the
articulation of societal values or precedent. I I' Some critics of ADR
emphasize the distinction between agreement and justice.1' 2 Owen Fiss, for
example, argues:
Their [public officials'] job is not to maximize the ends of private
parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but to explicate and give force to the
values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes:
to interpret those values and to bring reality in accord with them. 113
The issue of obtaining justice through the courts is sometimes framed in
terms of seeking vindication. 114
In the same way that mediators and arbitrators talk about relationships in
different ways, advocates of ADR and litigation mean different things by
justice. The justice available in litigation is the justice as articulated in the
law and accomplished by the legal system. Other conceptions of justice exist
and courts are constrained in the type of relief they can grant. 115 Mediation
focuses on justice as defined by the parties. 116
109 See John W. Cooley, Arbitration vs. Mediation-Explaining the Differences, 69
JUDICATURE 263, 264 (1985-86).
110 BENNETT, supra note 36, at 154; See also Cole & Blankley, supra note 35, at
324-25.
111 See also Seul, supra note 59, at 352-53; RUBEN, supra note 35, at 14.
112 Hoffmann, supra note 22, at 825.
113 Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) (identifying
additional problems with settlement including the difficulty of generating authoritative
consent because parties are organizations or social groups rather than individuals and the
inability to provide a foundation for continued judicial supervision). See also Harry T.
Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REv. 668,
676-79 (1986).
114 E.g., Grillo, supra note 88, at 1561; Sander & Goldberg, supra note 93, at 51-53.
115 Seul, supra note 59, at 341-44.
116 E.g., MOORE, supra note 23, at 18; Waldman, supra note 30, at 718-19.
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Another concern is that informal forums disadvantage weaker parties
including racial or ethnic minorities and women. Based on an analysis of the
social science literature on the causes of and strategies for reducing
prejudice, Richard Delgado and his co-authors argue that the expression of
prejudice is context-dependent and informality tends to increase its
expression. In contrast to ADR, "modern rules of procedure and evidence
contain numerous provisions that are intended to reduce prejudice in the trial
system by defining the scope of the action, formalizing the presentation of
evidence, and reducing strategic options for litigants and counsel." 117
Delgado and his co-authors argue that court adjudication, therefore, is more
appropriate for cases involving parties of unequal power and status, cases
that have a broad societal dimension, and possibly issues touching on
sensitive or intimate areas of life.11 8 Similarly, Trina Grillo agues that
mandatory mediation further disempowers socially disadvantaged groups,
particularly women. 119 She contends that women tend to have a more
relational sense of self.120 Mandatory divorce mediation requires direct
engagement, usually without a lawyer present. 121 In this context, Grillo
contends, women may act to maintain their connection to their spouse or
children at the expense of putting their own needs forward.122 Grillo
concludes mandatory divorce mediation represents a threat to women. 123
Proponents of mediation identify strategies to balance power but
acknowledge that they may not always be effective and the mediation may in
some situations need to be terminated. 124
As a rule-governed activity, courts interpret and establish precedent.
Even though arbitrators may issue decisions which articulate reasons, such
awards do not establish precedent.' 2 5 Precedent may be important for
establishing rights or legal endowments. 126 Settlement may stifle the
117 Richard Delgado, Chris Dunn, Pamela Brown, Helena Lee, & David Hubbert,
Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359, 1374.
118 Id. at 1402-04; See also Grillo, supra note 88, at 1588-90.
119d. at 1549-50.
120 Id. at 1601.
121 Id. at 1579.
122 Id. at 1604.
123 Id. at 1601.
124 E.g., Joan B. Kelly, Power Imbalance in Divorce and Interpersonal Mediation:
Assessment and Intervention, 13 MEDIATION Q. 85 (1995).
125 RUBEN, supra note 35, at 14.
126 Seul, supra note 59, at 349-50.
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development of law in "disfavored" areas such as civil rights or family
law. 127 Other uses of precedent include deterring similar claims in the
future 128 or preventing recurring violations. 129 Litigation may therefore be
an appropriate process for disputants who are seeking "justice," are
disempowered, or value the establishment of precedent.
Hybrid processes, according to their proponents, are capable of
combining the benefits of the constituent methods. For example, med-arb, it
is argued, combines the informality of mediation and its ability to address
underlying interests with arbitration's guarantee of a final resolution.1 30
Efficiency, in particular, is strongly emphasized. 131 Thomas J. Brewer and
Lawrence R. Mills, for example, contend: "Combined med-arb proceedings
can offer parties important dispute resolution advantages, such as: [t]he
parties can obtain a certain resolution of their dispute within a reasonable
time, [and t]he resolution can often be achieved at a reduced cost and with
improved overall efficiency." 132 In the labor field, authors disagree regarding
what types of disputes med-arb is most appropriate for. 133
The ADR literature as a whole emphasizes parties' awareness of and
voluntary participation in the various dispute resolution processes. 134 For
example, Love argues: "Mediators are not foreclosed from engaging in some
other process or helping parties design a mixed process. Whatever the service
being provided, however, it should be requested by the parties and accurately
labeled."' 135 In the succeeding parts of this article, I recognize that
participants in ethics consultation may value the potential goals differently.
While advocating for the use of mediation, I recognize that others,
emphasizing determinative outcomes or efficiency, may choose a hybrid
process. I, nonetheless, contend that proponents of hybrid processes do not
127 Edwards, supra note 113, at 679; See also Fiss, supra note 113, at 1085.
128 Seul, supra note 59, at 352-53.
129 Sander & Goldberg, supra note 93, at 60.
130 Bartel, supra note 79, at 665.
131 See Elliott, supra note 63, at 164; Milne, Folberg, & Salem, supra note 26, at 11;
TELFORD, supra note 61, at 2.
132 Brewer & Mills, supra note 46, at 34 (listing more control over the process than
"pure" arbitration and greater finality than "pure" mediation as advantages of med-arb).
133 Compare Bartel, supra note 79, at 678, and Henry, supra note 79, at 396, with
TELFORD, supra note 61, at 6, 9.
134 See Gerald F. Phillips, Same-Neutral Med-Arb: What Does the Future Hold?,
DisP. RESOL. J., May-July 2005, at 24, 26-27; Sander & Goldberg, supra note 93, at 49-
50; Seul, supra note 59, at 352; Stempel, supra note 61, at 269, 284; Riskin, supra note
25, at 13-14.
135 Love, supra note 57, at 948.
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take adequate account of the due process protections incorporated into
arbitration or the issues articulated in the ADR literature regarding the
combination of the roles of mediator and arbitrator.
III. ADR AND ETHICS CONSULTATION
Ethics committees and consultation developed as an explicit alternative
to litigation. 136 Courts, with the exception of those in Massachusetts, have
tended to view themselves as less-than-ideal decisionmakers. The New
Jersey Supreme Court, for example, emphasized the need for expertise and
efficiency in its decision to withdraw life sustaining treatment. It stated,
"[w]e consider that a practice of applying to a court to confirm such
decisions would generally be inappropriate, not only because that would be a
gratuitous encroachment upon the medical profession's field of competence,
but because it would be impossibly cumbersome." 137
In contrast, the Massachusetts Supreme Court emphasized justice:
Rather, such questions of life and death seem to us to require the
process of detached but passionate investigation and decision that forms the
ideal on which the judicial branch of government was created. Achieving
this ideal is our responsibility and that of the lower court, and not to be
entrusted to any other group purporting to represent the 'morality and
conscience of our society,' no matter how highly motivated or impressively
constituted. 138
As we have seen, the prioritization of different goals leads to the
selection of different dispute resolution processes.
The President's Commission identified the need for a review of decisions
to forego life-sustaining treatment and, while acknowledging beneficial
aspects of the judicial process, argued that initial recourse should be to ethics
committees. 139 Commendable aspects of judicial process, according to the
Commission's report, include public proceedings, principled decisionmaking,
136 See Paris & Reardon, supra note 17, at 112-16.
137 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 669 (N.J. 1976). See generally Robin Fretwell
Wilson, Hospital Ethics Committees as the Forum of Last Resort: An Idea Whose Time
Has Not Come, 76 N.C. L. REv. 353, 359-60, 368-69 (1997-98).
138 Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 435
(Mass. 1977). See generally Fentiman, supra note 22, at 829-33; Yeun, supra note 9, at
600-04.
139 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 11, at 153-70.
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impartial decisionmakers, and an adversarial process. 140 The Commission
also identified a number of reasons, including some of these same attributes,
against judicial involvement:
[Jiudicial review in such cases is costly in terms of time and expense; it
can disrupt the process of providing care for the patient, since medical
decisionmaking is evolutionary rather than static; it can create unnecessary
strains in the relationship between the surrogate decisionmakers and others,
such as the health care providers, who may be forced into the role of formal
adversaries in the litigation; and it exposes ordinarily quite private matters
to the scrutiny of the courtroom and sometimes even to the glare of the
public communications media. 141
The Commission concluded that the detriments of routine court review
outweighed the benefits. 142 This conclusion was supported, in the
Commission's view, by the fact that courts typically did not have enough
information to determine whether the course of action was correct and simply
deferred to the treating physician. 143 While acknowledging concerns and
unresolved issues with ethics committees, 144 the Commission tentatively
recommended their use. 145 The report cited a number of benefits: rapid
review, sensitive decisionmaking, and informal and private procedures. 146
The Commission nonetheless envisioned the need for judicial review in
unusual cases. 147
The need for, and the court's possession of, medical or ethical expertise
has been a significant issue in this debate. For example, the D.C. Court of
Appeals asserted:
We observe ... that it would be far better if judges were not called to
patients' bedsides and required to make quick decisions on issues of life and
140 Id. at 159.
141 Id. at 159. See also Bernard Lo, Fenella Rouse, & Laurie Dornbrand, Family
Decision Making on Trial: Who Decides for Incompetent Patients?, 322 N. ENG. J. MED.
1228, 1231 (1990); Robert Steinbrook & Bernard Lo, Artificial Feeding-Solid Ground,
Not a Slippery Slope, 318 N. ENG. J. MED. 286, 289 (1988).
142 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 11, at 160.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 165-68 (identifying unresolved issues including unintentionally increasing
the number and type of cases reviewed and who should serve on the committees).
145 Id. at 168-69.
146 Id.
147 See Id. at 164, 167. See generally Diane E. Hoffmann, Regulating Ethics
Committees in Health Care Institutions-Is it Time?, 50 MD. L. REv. 746, 781-84 (1991).
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death. Because judgment in such a case involves complex medical and
ethical issues as well as the application of legal principles, we would urge
the establishment-through legislation or otherwise-of another tribunal to
make these decisions, with limited opportunity for judicial review. 148
In contrast, Robin Fretwell Wilson argues that courts make decisions in
other areas requiring technical expertise, such as technology. 149 She also
identifies tools the court may utilize to evaluate technical information,
including expert testimony, special masters, amicus curiae briefs, and Court
Guidelines. 150 These mechanisms, however, tend to increase expertise at the
expense of efficiency. Regarding ethical expertise, Wilson contends that
judges possess some of these skills by virtue of their training, and that these
skills are not within the sole providence of ethicists. 15 1 She also emphasizes
that many members of ethics committees possess no formal ethics
training. 152 If one emphasizes the role of expertise, Wilson is correct to note
the importance of training and qualifications.
The President's Commission report helped to catalyze the formation of
ethics committees as the preliminary level of review. 153 The approaches to
ethics consultation which subsequently developed represent, from the
prospective of the ADR literature, a hybrid process. 154 The ADR literature
helps to identify problematic features of such processes, such as the use of
caucuses, which ethics consultants do not adequately recognize. 
155
The American Society for Bioethics and Humanities' (ASBH's) Core
Competencies for Health Care Ethics Consultation is the authoritative
statement on this topic. 156 It identifies ethics facilitation as the most
148 In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237 n.2 (D.C. 1990).
149 Wilson, supra note 137, at 372.
150 Id. at 372-74, 375-76.
151 Id. at 374-75.
152 Id. at 384-86.
153 See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
154 Cf Gatter, supra note 22, at 1095, 1118, 1130-31.
155 See infra notes 177-81, 197-208 and accompanying text.
156 ASBH, supra note 10, at 1 (describing the study's initiation by the Society for
Health and Human Values (SHHV) and the Society for Bioethics Consultation (SBC)).
The report was reviewed and adopted by ASBH after it was formed by the merger of
SHHV, SBC, and American Association of Bioethics. ASBH is the primary professional
organization in bioethics and medical humanities with approximately 1,500 members. See
Board of Directors of the American Society of Bioethics and Humanities to President
George W. Bush, Aug. 2, 2004, http://www.asbh.org/about/action/Bush-ethicsand_
detainees.pdf.).
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appropriate approach to ethics consultation in our society.' 57 The report
emphasizes the increasing plurality of values in American society. 158 Ethics
facilitation is characterized as an alternative to the extremes of the
authoritarian and pure facilitation approaches. 159
The report criticizes the authoritarian and pure facilitation approaches
using a casuistic mode of argumentation; it supports its claims by the
presentation of exemplary cases. The Core Competencies identifies the
defining characteristic of the authoritarian approach as "its emphasis on
consultants as the primary moral decisionmakers at the expense of the
appropriate moral decisionmakers."' 160 This can occur either in terms of
process or outcome. An inappropriate outcome is illustrated by a consultant
who recommends a competent, well-informed, adult Jehovah's Witness be
transfused against his wishes because the consultant argues the patient's
religious beliefs are false. 161 Erroneous process is exemplified in the report
by a consultant who recommends that a futile treatment be discontinued
without discussing the situation with the patient and family. 162 On the other
hand, the inadequacies of the pure facilitation approach are also illustrated by
a case- the patient's family and health care team agree to override a valid
advance directive. 163 The authors appear to favor ethics facilitation as a
means of achieving justice while acknowledging pluralism.
The ethics facilitation approach overcomes these shortcomings,
according to the report's authors. 164 In contrast to authoritarian and pure
facilitation approaches, the ethics facilitation approach identifies and
analyzes the nature of the value uncertainty and facilitates the building of
consensus. The identification and analysis of the value uncertainty includes
identifying the range of morally acceptable options. 165 The report
recommends that consultants be aware of how their own personal moral
views influence their work. This influence, the report argues, should be made
transparent, and consultants should not usurp decisionmaking authority or
impose their values. 166
157 ASBH, supra note 10, at 4-5.
158 Id. at 4.
159 Id. at5.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 5-6.
162 Id. at 6.
163 ASBH, supra note 10, at 6.
164 Id. at5.
165 Id. at 6.
166 Id. at7.
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The report identifies the skills, knowledge, and character traits required
to perform clinical ethics consultation. 167 Three categories of skills are
identified-ethical assessment, process, and interpersonal skills-and basic
and advanced skills in each category are distinguished. 168 The report
differentiates the level of skill which every team or committee member needs
and the skills an individual consultant, or at least one group member, must
possess. 169 Process skills, for example, include the ability to engage in
creative problem solving. 170
The ethics facilitation model can best be characterized as a hybrid
approach. Identification and analysis of the nature of the value uncertainty
appears to require the consultant in some circumstances to make decisions
for the parties 17 1 as an arbitrator would. This does not appear to simply be a
means of reality testing, nor is the consultant recommended to withdraw
from the process. Facilitating the building of consensus is consistent with
mediation. The report explicitly states: "Formal training in specific
techniques such as mediation, conflict resolution, or facilitation is one way to
obtain advanced interpersonal and process skills." 17 2
The document, however, is unclear regarding the scope of consultant
authority. It relies on the distinction between personal moral values and
societal values and law and emphasizes that consultants should not impose
their own values. 173 The report, however, does not identify criteria for
distinguishing public values from private. 174 The authors also fail to address
situations in which parties may disagree with societal values, for example,
seeking physician-assisted suicide or denying the validity of neurological
criteria for death.
What degree or type of societal consensus is sufficient to constrain
individuals' decisionmaking? The characterization of the futility example, as
a shortcoming in process rather than outcome, is notable in this regard.
167 Id. at 11-23.
16 8 Id. at 12-16.
169 ASBH, supra note 10, at 15.
170 Id. at 14.
171 Compare id. at 6-7, with id. at 8.
172 Id. at 16. Cf. id. at 16 ("Other ways of obtaining these skills include supervised
clinical practicums, mentoring processes (apprenticeships with effective modeling), or
fellowship programs that emphasize developing process and interpersonal skills in ethics
consultation.").
173 ASBH, supra note 10, at 5-7.
174 Cf Edwards, supra note 113, at 671-72.
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Futility, as the report acknowledges, is a controversial concept. 175 The
consultant's recommendation may be authoritarian not only in process but
also in outcome because, although the concept of futility has support in the
literature, it is not universally held or legally enforceable except in Texas. 176
The report lacks a developed conception of consensus that would justify the
consultant's authoritative decisionmaking for the parties. ' ,
The document contains a brief description of the consultation process
which touches on a number of due process issues. The report contends access
to ethics consultation should be open to patients, families, and surrogates and
notes disagreement regarding which health care providers or others may
request consultation. 177 It contends that patients, or their surrogates, and the
attending physician must be notified of consultation requests. The report,
however, limits notification of patient to "situations where their participation
in decisionmaking is ethically required," and permits consultations to
proceed, in some cases, in spite of the patient's refusal to participate. 178 The
report advocates that institutions develop policies regarding the degree and
type of documentation, but does not make specific recommendations beyond
communicating the results of consultations requiring patient involvement to
the patient. 179 These processes offer significantly weaker protections for
patient participation than arbitration would. 180 Additional issues identified in
the ADR literature, such as the use of caucuses, 181 are not addressed.
Nancy N. Dubler and Carol Liebman explicitly propose incorporating
mediation into bioethics consultation in a process they term "bioethics
mediation." 182 They claim: "Whereas mediation has been proposed as one
perspective for training professionals and conducting a consultation, we
would like to suggest that it is the best theoretical framework in which to
175 ASBH, supra note 10, at 6. See Robert M. Taylor & John D. Lantos, The Politics
of Medical Futility, 11 ISSUES L. MED. 3 (1995).
176 See Thaddeus M. Pope & Ellen A. Waldman, Mediation at the End of Life:
Getting Beyond the Limits of the Talking Cure, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 143
(2007).
177 ASBH, supra note 10, at 9.
1781Id.
179 Id. at 10.
180 See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
181 See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
182 See NANCY N. DUBLER & CAROL B. LIEBMAN, BIOETHICS MEDIATION: A GUIDE
TO SHAPING SHARED SOLUTIONS (United Hospital Fund of New York 2004). See also
DUBLER & MARCUS, supra note 22.
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embed these tasks[.]"' 183 They characterize bioethics mediation as a
multistage process which includes: assessment and preparation, beginning
the mediation, presenting and refining the medical facts, gathering
information, problem solving, resolution, and follow-up. 184
Specific to their proposal is an emphasis on establishing the medical
facts. 185 This emphasis is congruent with the authors' understanding of a
common source of conflict-inadequate communication. The authors
contend that differing opinions among the care team are often communicated
to patients or their surrogates. These mixed messages often lead to confusion
and produce conflict. 186 Establishing the medical facts eliminates these
mixed messages. It involves, in the authors' view, speaking with individual
team members and facilitating a meeting with the care team prior to the
mediation session. 187
During the mediation session itself, the mediator may hold further
caucuses. Reasons for caucusing include "to obtain confidential
information." 188 Mediators' skills include summarizing, refraining, and
reality testing. 189 For example, the bioethics mediator may reality-test by
183 DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 182, at 1, 8. Other related claims appear to
restrict mediation to a component of ethics consultation rather than a comprehensive
methodology. See, e.g., id. at xiii ("We are suggesting, in this book, that although there
might be other ways to acquire these [interpersonal and process] skills, by far the most
effective and efficient way is to study the body of knowledge, skills, and techniques
represented by the field of mediation.").
184 Id. at 45.
185 Id. at 27-28.
186 Id. at xiv, 50. See also R. Forde & I. H. Vandvik, Clinical Ethics, Information,
and Communication: Review of 31 Cases from a Clinical Ethics Committee, 31 J. MED.
ETHIcs 73, 74 (2005) (reporting that issues related to information or communication were
an explicit problem in 3 of 31 cases brought to a clinical ethics committee, and an
implicit problem in 22 of 31 cases); John A. McClung, Russell S. Kamer, Margaret
DeLuca, & Harlan J. Barber, Evaluation of a Medical Ethics Consultation Service:
Opinions of Patients and Health Care Providers, 100 AM. J. MED. 456, 459 (1996)
(reporting that 13% of physicians, 20% of nurses, and 59% of family members reported a
lack of communication as a problem in a situation resulting in an ethics consult). A more
robust conflict map would include a variety of types of conflicts including value,
relationship, data, interest, and structural conflicts. Data conflicts may involve
misinformation but can also involve different assessment procedures. Such conflicts
might be addressed through the use of third-party experts. See MOORE, supra note 23, at
64-65.
187 DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 182, at 29, 50-53.
188 Id. at 94-95.
189 See id. at 85-97.
[Vol. 23:1 20071
ETHICAL EXPERTISE AND BEST INTERESTS FAVOR MEDIATION
asking what will happen if the issue is not resolved, or how the other party is
likely to respond.190
While the authors emphasize mediation, I contend that bioethics
mediation is more accurately characterized as a hybrid process because the
neutral may make decisions for the principal parties. Dubler and Liebman
assert that one of the fundamental goals of bioethics mediation is to
maximize the likelihood that the resolution will fall within clearly accepted
ethical principles, legal stipulations, and moral rules. 191 They claim:
"Sometimes in bioethics mediation the mediator will need to step out of the
role of mediator and into the role of consultant. This role switch is most
likely to happen if the process is leading to an ethically unsupportable
outcome." 192 They then characterize consultation as a "directed, substantive
process." 193 Although some of the authors' language suggests the mediator
educates the parties, 194 the authors' main emphasis is that the mediator
constrains the outcome. 195 This role is congruent with the role of the
arbitrator. 196
Dubler and Liebman acknowledge, but do not adequately address, this
issue. In a footnote, the authors acknowledge that med-arb:
[I]s controversial (and disfavored by the authors) because the
knowledge that the neutral mediator may ultimately pass judgment on what
he or she has heard is likely to affect what the participants say to the
mediator and how they say it and also affect the type of information the
mediator elicits and to which he or she attends. 197
The authors fail, however, to differentiate bioethics mediation from med-
arb or identify how they mitigate the adverse effects on party participation.
The characterization of bioethics mediation as a hybrid process is also
supported by Dubler and Liebman's cases. For example, "A Dying Patient
and the Issue of Scarce Resources: Alex Barlow's Case," involves a nineteen-
year-old who is dying as the result of a brain tumor, sepsis, and a chronic
190 Id. at 95.
19 1 Id. at 10-11. See also id. at 24-25, 77.
192 DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 182 at 13. See also id. at 50 n.4.
193 Id. at 14.
194 Id. at 13.
195 See id. at 46. See also Waldman, supra note 30, at 754 (characterizing bioethics
mediation as norm-advocating rather than norm-educating mediation).
196 See supra notes 35-51 and accompanying text.
197 DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 182, at 13 n.4.
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lung infection and who is being treated with platelets that are in short
supply.198, The mediator takes a number of direct actions including
requesting a palliative care consult. 199 The mediator also describes her role
to the patient's sister as placing constraints on the possible decisions. 2°° She
identifies three systems for distributing scare resources and states that the
hospital utilizes, the third- system, most likely to benefit, and, therefore, the
patient will be denied platelets. 20 1 This represents decisionmaking rather
than education. The patient might be eligible for platelets under the first or
second systems, queuing or lottery, 20 2 but the mediator does not justify why
these options are excluded. Like the Core Competencies, the authors do not
present criteria to identify when there is sufficient consensus to legitimate the
consultant constraining the outcome.
A number of considerations appear to contribute to the author's
preference for a hybrid process. The dominant concern appears to be
preventing the parties from colluding in an immoral agreement.203 The
authors do not, however, present evidence that this is a frequent occurrence
that the initial dispute resolution process needs to be designed to prevent.
Other features of the process might, in fact, limit the occurrence of
unconscionable outcomes. For example, the presence of multiple parties,
including some, such as doctors and nurses, who have received training in
medical ethics, 204 may significantly reduce immoral agreements.
Dubler and Liebman also emphasize the need for a determinative
outcome and efficiency. The authors state, "[dieciding not to reach a
resolution is not an option." 205 This claim is bolstered by their further
198 Id. at 15-19. See also id. at 3-5 (describing the mediator, rather than the care
team, conveying the patient's imminent demise to the patient's wife).
199 Id. at 16.
200 Id. at 17.
201 Id.
202 Cf. JOHN F. KILNER, WHO LIVES? WHO DIES?: ETHICAL CRITERIA IN PATIENT
SELECTION (Yale University Press 1990).
203 DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 182, at 13.
204 Training in medical ethics is an accreditation requirement of medical schools and
residency programs. See Liaison Committee on Medical Education, Function and
Structure of a Medical School, Standards for Accreditation of Medical Education
Programs Leading to the M.D. Degree 3 (2007), available at
http://www.lcme.org/functions2007jun.pdf; Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical
Education, Institutional Requirements 10 (2003), available at
http://www.acgme.org/acWebsite/irc/irc-IRCpr703.pdf. Ethics education is also a
function of ethics committees. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
205 DUBLER & LIEBMAN, supra note 182, at 21. See also id. at 25.
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assertion that "[t]ime is of the essence." 206 The authors clarify that there are
default rules that apply if an agreement cannot be reached, 207 but the need for
a resolution is nevertheless internalized to the bioethics mediation process.
Dubler and Liebman also do not present evidence that the default rules
cannot provide a determinative or efficient outcome.
The underlying issue may be better characterized as the perceived
inadequacy of the default rules rather than the need for a determinative
outcome or efficiency. The default rules typically require patients' (or their
proxies', parents', or guardians') consent for administering new or
withdrawing existing treatments. These rules typically preserve the status
quo. Alterations in these default rules to promote determinative outcomes
and efficiency would have significant implications for the relative power of
patient and medical staff.208
In spite of their differences, the Core Competencies and Bioethics
Mediation both represent hybrid approaches. 20 9 While the consultant
attempts to facilitate agreement, the consultant may make decisions for the
principal parties which delimit the range of acceptable outcomes. Neither
proposal identifies criteria for which norms the consultant may legitimately
enforce. Furthermore, neither adequately addresses the due process
protections required by adjudication or. acknowledges the potential
limitations of hybrid processes.
IV. DuE PROCESS
While I argue that mediation is a more appropriate process for pediatric
ethics consultation than arbitration or hybrid processes, 210 I recognize that
others may evaluate the benefits and detriments of the available processes
differently. Efficiency and a determinate outcome may be more highly
valued by some, and used to justify hybrid models. My review of the ADR
literature has shown that arbitration is a more formal process than mediation
and advocates of hybrid process recognize the potential conflicts between the
various third party roles and the way combining processes alters them. 211
2 06 Id. at 21. See also id. at 27, 36.
207 Id. at 25.
208 See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
209 See supra notes 171-72, 191-202 and accompanying text.
210 See infra notes 222-298 and accompanying text.
211 See supra notes 44-48, 86-91 and accompanying text.
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Proponents of approaches incorporating arbitration must, however, pay
greater attention to due process protections.
Attention to due process was a more prominent concern in the earlier
ethics consultation literature. Susan Wolf, for example, argues that although
ethics committees should be advisory, they should offer procedural
protections because of their potential influence and their full range of
obligations. 212 By advisory, Wolf means that patients possess the binding
decisional authority. 213 Committees may, nonetheless, be accorded or seek
influence. Influence may be accorded to the committee's recommendations
by patients, their surrogates, their caregivers, and possibly the courts.
Patients may be constrained from seeking court intervention. 214 In addition,
committees have sought to make treatment decisions and urged courts to
defer to them.215 Wolf argues that this influence engenders procedural due
process obligations. 216
Wolf outlines a number of protections. They include:
[N]otice [including notice of the committee's existence and functions,
of the procedures and procedural options, and of the intention to consider a
case], an opportunity to be heard, a chance to confront those in opposition,
receipt of a written determination and a statement of reasons, and an
opportunity to challenge that determination. 2 17
For example, she argues that, "[w]ithout notice, patients and their
representatives have no way of challenging, correcting, participating in, or
simply monitoring ethics committee consideration of the patient's case."'218
Participation decreases the likelihood of error regarding the medical facts,
patient's views, and the ethical conclusions and increases the likelihood the
committee will fulfill its obligations. Wolf also contends that committees
212 Susan M. Wolf, Ethics Committees and Due Process: Nesting Rights in a
Community of Caring, 50 MD. L. REv. 798, 831 (1991).
213 See id. at 836.
214 Id. at 833.
2 151 d. at 810.
216 Id. at 833. See also Hoffmann, supra note 147, at 751 ("[T]he decisionmaking
authority of ethics committees should be expanded to permit their use as an alternative to
judicial decisionmaking only if the typical composition of ethics committees is
fundamentally changed and numerous safeguards are implemented, including provisions
for due process and the monitoring of committee deliberations and recommendations.").
217 Wolf, supra note 212, at 831.
2 18 Id. at 847.
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have an obligation to periodically evaluate their procedures. 219 These
protections are significantly greater than those articulated in the Core
Competencies220 or Bioethics Mediation.221
V. ETHICAL EXPERTISE AND THE BEST INTERESTS STANDARD
In cases of significant conflict in pediatrics, I argue that a single best
outcome is unlikely due to the nature of both moral expertise and the best
interests standard. This makes rule-governed activities such as arbitration
inappropriate. While arbitration might be used in a hybrid process to delimit
boundaries, this process will not necessarily produce a determinative
outcome. Absent this benefit, the risks of deforming the communication
process by combining mediation and arbitration are uncompensated. Part of
the issue turns on the likelihood of an unconscionable agreement. Lacking
published data, my experience is that such outcomes are unlikely and may be
adequately addressed by the consultant terminating the process. In the
absence of a mediated agreement, the default decisionmakers are the patient's
parents or legal guardian. Their decisionmaking authority should only be
overridden in cases of abuse or neglect. Evaluation of cases of potential
abuse or neglect involves a narrower normative standard and could be
performed by different neutral arbitration with appropriate due process
protections. Results of this process could include referral to child protective
services.
Adjudication is a rule-governed activity. 222 For ethics consultation to be
analogous to adjudication, the consultant must be able to apply the applicable
norms to the situation univocally. Diane E. Hoffman, for example, notes:
[The norm-centered approach] assumes that the application of the legal
and ethical principles articulated by ethics committees will lead to a clear,
singular and 'right' answer. The assumption is especially suspect when the
norms being applied are rather vague and subjective, or nonexistent. An
example is the application of the best interest standard. 223
While ethical expertise is possible, it is unreasonable to expect it to
provide a single right answer, especially on subjects engendering significant
219 Id. at 851.
220 See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
221 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
222 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
223 Hoffmann, supra note 22, at 871.
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conflict. Furthermore, the best interests standard, as Hoffman notes, is too
indeterminate to provide such guidance.
Bruce D. Weinstein provides a useful discussion of expertise and
specifically moral expertise. He distinguishes two senses of expertise. 224
Expertise in the epistemological sense entails knowledge in or about a
particular field. 225 Weinstein also describes this as the capability to offer
strong justifications for a range of propositions in the field.226 In contrast,
expertise in the performative sense involves the ability to perform a
demonstrable skill well. 227 These senses are conceptually and logically
distinct in that experts in one sense need not be experts in the other sense. An
expert juggler, for example, does not need to be able to explain how to
juggle. 228 Weinstein recognizes issues in differentiating degrees of strength
of justification for a proposition, and that such differentiation in relation to
time, domain, and population. 229 He claims epistemic expertise only exists in
domains which admit to objective truth. 230 In nontechnical fields, nonexperts
may nonetheless hold justified beliefs. 231 Experts need not agree particularly
when all relevant evidence is not available or there is disagreement about
what evidence is relevant.232 Experts also do not always have to be right.233
In a subsequent article, Weinstein argues that ethical expertise is
possible. 234 Based on his distinction between epistemic and performative
expertise and the epistemic subdomains of ethics, he argues it is possible to
have epistemic expertise in descriptive ethics (the study of the moral beliefs
of a particular culture, institution or religious tradition), metaethics (the study
of the language and logic of moral arguments), 235 and normative ethics. 236
224 Bruce D. Weinstein, What is an Expert?, 14 THEOR. MED. 57, 58 (1993). See
also Francoise Baylis, Persons with Moral Expertise and Moral Experts: Wherein Lies
the Difference?, in CLINICAL ETHIcs: THEORY AND PRACTICE 89 (Barry Hoffmaster,
Benjamin Freedman, & Gwen Fraser eds., 1989).
225 Weinstein, supra note 224, at 58.
226 Id. at 63.
227 Id. at 58-62.
2 2 8 Id. at 58.
229 Id. at 70-71.
2 30 Id. at 66-67.
231 Weinstein, supra note 224, at 64.
232 Id. at 69.
233 Id. at 67-68.
234 Bruce D. Weinstein, The Possibility of Ethical Expertise, 15 THEOR. MED. 61
(1994).
235 Id. at 63-64.
236 Id. at 67-70.
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Performative expertise in living a good life is also possible. 237 Many authors
contend that the form of ethical expertise relevant to philosophers or clinical
ethicists is epistemological rather than performative. 238 Peter Singer, for
example, states: "It is important to note.., that this alleged expertise does
not consist in the possession of special moral wisdom, or privileged insights
into moral truth, but in understanding the nature of moral theories and the
possible methods of moral argument." 239
Weinstein argues that disagreement among experts in normative ethics
does not preclude the possibility of expertise in this domain. 240 He argues
moral prescriptions are capable of justification by appeal to moral rules,
principles, and theories.24 1 He cites Paul Ramsey and Richard McCormick's
debate concerning nontherapeutic research on children as an example. 242
Both Ramsey and McCormick were experts because neither merely asserted
their beliefs; both provided well-supported reasons and their conclusions of
their arguments followed from the premises. Ramsey and McCormick
nonetheless disagreed. 243 Ethical expertise consists of giving and analyzing
reasons but need not result in agreement.
Many criticisms of claims to ethical expertise focus on whether ethics is
objective knowledge. Giles R. Scofield for example, asserts: "Ultimately, the
claims ethics consultants make simply cannot be proven because ethics is not
like mathematics or the physical sciences." 244 Access to moral truths is not,
however, necessary for moral expertise. There are other fields, such as
architecture, economics, and genetic counseling, where expertise is
237 Id. at 70-71.
238 See George J. Agich & Bethany J. Spielman, Ethics Expert Testimony: Against
the Skeptics, 22 J. MED. PHIL. 381, 386-87 (1997).
239 Peter Singer, Ethics and Experts: How Do We Decide?, HASTINGS CTR. REP.,
June 1982, at 9, 9.
240 Weinstein, supra note 234, at 67. See generally Jan Crosthwaite, Moral
Expertise: A Problem in the Professional Ethics of Professional Ethicists, 9 BIOETHICS
361 (1995). But cf Christopher Cowley, A New Rejection of Moral Expertise, 8 MED.
HEALTH CARE PHIL. 273 (2005).
241 Weinstein, supra note 234, at 67.
242 Id. at 67-70.
243 Id. at 68.
244 Giles R. Scofield, Ethics Consultation: The Least Dangerous Profession?, 2
CAMB. Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 417, 420 (1993). See also Ruth Shalit, When We Were
Philosopher Kings: The Rise of the Medical Ethicist, 216 NEW REP., APR. 28, 1997, at 24
("The problem with all this is basic. 'Clinical ethics' is not medicine, which is to say it is
not science, which is to say it is to a very large degree whatever anyone wants it to be.").
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recognized without objective knowledge. Rather than truth, practitioners in
these fields provide knowledgeable answers along with good reasons. 245
There are also moral arguments against ethical expertise. Moral
expertise, critics argue, is inconsistent with liberal democracy and is
dangerous. 246 Scofield argues:
[T]o believe that someone possesses specialized knowledge in applied
ethics presupposes that some individuals are legally regarded as knowing
better than others what should, from an ethical perspective, be done in a
given situation. The difficulty with this claim is that it is antithetical to the
foundational beliefs of a pluralistic democracy. 247
Scofield, therefore, limits the ethicist's role to educating others-teaching
them how to approach and think about moral problems. 248 Equality in terms
of moral agency, however, need not entail equality in terms of moral
knowledge or decisionmaking skills.249 The moral arguments against ethical
expertise, therefore, do not necessarily deny the existence of such expertise
but constrain how it is exercised. It should be used to facilitate others' moral
development rather than constrain their decisionmaking.
Bernard Gert, Charles M. Culver, and K. Danner Clouser provide a more
comprehensive moral theory which adds to the framework provided by
Weinstein. Gert, Culver, and Clouser develop a comprehensive moral theory,
which they call "common morality," 250 which has several powerful
explanatory features relevant to my consideration of ADR and ethics
consultation. Their position accounts for the presence of generalized moral
knowledge, while permitting a limited scope for moral expertise. 251 Gert,
245 See Baylis, supra note 224, at 90-91. See also Scot D. Yoder, The Nature of
Ethical Expertise, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 11-15.
246 Id. at 12.
247 Giles R. Scofield, Is the Medical Ethicist an "Expert"?, 3 BIOETHICs BULL. 1, 9
(1994). See also Scofield, supra note 244, at 422 ("[T]he ultimate problem with the
claims ethics consultants make is that they cannot be true in a pluralistic, democratic
society founded on the belief that each person is the moral equal of every other.").
248 Scofield, supra note 244, at 423-24. It is unclear, however, whether this role is
compatible with prospective case consultation. See also Christian Lilje, Ethics
Consultation: A Dangerous, Antidemocratic Charlatanry?, 2 CAMB. Q. HEALTHCARE
ETHICS 438, 440 (1993).
249 Donnie J. Self, Is Ethics Consultation Dangerous?, 2 CAMB. Q. HEALTHCARE
ETHICS 442, 442 (1993).
250 BERNARD GERT ET AL., BIOETHICS: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH 21-23 (Oxford
University Press, 2d ed. 2006).
251 See infra notes 254-59 and accompanying text.
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Culver, and Clouser also recognize unresolvable moral disagreement and
identify its sources. 252 Finally, their distinction between moral rules and
moral ideals can be used to legitimize a restricted adjudicatory function.253
Gert, Culver, and Clouser emphasize that there is widespread agreement
on most moral matters. 254 This agreement is, however, in their view
obscured by concentration on controversial moral issues. 255 They distinguish
the moral system and moral theory. The moral system comes first and moral
theory systematically describes and justifies it. Moral theory, according to
the authors, does not create the moral system. 256 The authors analogize the
moral system and moral theory to language and grammar. 257 Moral theory is
firmly based on and tested by clear moral intuitions.258 Individuals,
therefore, have a significant degree of moral knowledge. 259
Gert, Culver, and Clouser's moral theory distinguishes moral rules, moral
ideals, and morally relevant features of situations, and identifies a two-step
procedure for evaluating conflicts among rules or between rules and
ideals. 260 Moral rules center on human vulnerability and require abstaining
from unjustifiably causing harm to others. The authors argue that all rational
persons want to avoid death, pain, disability, loss of freedom, and loss of
pleasure unless they have an adequate reason not to.261 The moral rules
prohibit causing one of the harms (do not kill), or the kinds of actions that
generally increase the amount of harm (do not deceive). 262 In the context of
pediatric ethics consultation, this agreement provides the basis for enforcing
norms against child abuse and neglect. The authors justify their focus on
harm rather than benefit on several grounds: there is no agreement on what is
the greatest good, avoiding harm is more important than gaining good, and
focusing on the promotion of good encourages unjustified paternalism. 263
Moral ideals encourage people to prevent or relieve harm to others. Moral
ideals, unlike moral rules, however, cannot not be followed all the time or
252 See infra notes 271-76 and accompanying text.
253 See infra notes 260-70, 277-78 and accompanying text.
254 GERT ET AL., supra note 250, at 21.
255 Id. at 22.
256 Id. at 5-6, 25-26.
257 Id. at 24-25.
258 Id. at 6.
259 Id. at 3-4.
260 GERT ET AL., supra note 250, at 10, 35-36.
261 Id. at 28.
262 Id. at 35-36.
263 Id. at 11-14.
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followed impartially toward everyone. 264 These rules and ideals are general
but can be specified in terms of particular cultures 265 or professions.
266
Determination of when it is justified to violate a moral rule is
accomplished via a two-step procedure. For example, breaking a trivial
promise to aid an injured person is morally acceptable. 267 The first step of
the procedure is to describe the act in terms of the morally relevant features.
Gert, Culver, and Clouser characterize possibly morally relevant features
through a series of questions including: "What harms would be (a) avoided,
(b) prevented, and (c) caused?" 268 The second step is determining which will
produce less overall harm: everyone knowing the action will be interpreted as
a violation of a moral rule, or everyone knowing it will not be interpreted as
a violation of a moral rule. 269 Differing degrees of justification of the
violation of a moral rule are possible depending on the existence and degree
of disagreement regarding the amount of harm. 270
Gert, Culver, and Clouser argue that a moral theory need not provide a
unique right answer to every moral problem and provide an account of the
sources of unresolvable moral disagreement. 271 The recognition of
unresolvable moral disagreement is important in framing what can be
accomplished within ethics consultation. Gert, Culver, and Clouser argue that
there are four reasons for unresolvable moral disagreement: 272
264 Id. at 43-44.
265 Id., at 78-82.
266 GERT ET AL., supra note 250, at 88-92.
267 Id. at 60.
268 Id. at 39.
269 Id. at 38-39, 83-86, 121-22.
270 Id. at 42. Compare id. at 96 ("There is no moral expertise"), with GERT ET AL.,
supra note 250, at 96 ("No one should defer to an ethicist when a moral decision is called
for. Nor should one allow an ethicist or 'moral expert' to overrule one's own moral
intuitions or to inhibit one from participating in moral deliberations. Ordinary
understanding of ethics is usually sufficient, as long as one knows and appreciates the
facts, purposes, understandings, and relationships of the field with whose ethics she is
dealing.").
271 Id. at 3-5, 21-22.
272 Id. at 16, 59-60 (stating that disagreement about facts is the most common form
of unresolvable moral disagreement and, therefore, omitting it from their list of the
sources of moral disagreement because it is not denied or neglected). But cf id. at 35
("[O]ur experience on ethics committees and in doing ethics consultations has been that
most actual moral disagreements are base d on disagreements about the facts of the case,
especially disagreements about prognoses.").
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(1) Differences in the Rankings of the Harms (Evils) and Benefits
(Goods): There is no objective ranking of harms and benefits that
resolves all controversies. For example, in the debate over the
legalization of physician-assisted suicide, individuals may
legitimately disagree on how the relief of unwanted pain and
suffering should be weighed against people dying earlier than they
really want to.27 3
(2) Differences about Human Nature or the Nature of Human Societies:
In the second step of evaluating the violation of a moral rule,
individuals may disagree about what would happen if everyone were
to know that certain kinds of violation of a moral rule were allowed.
How frequently would laws making it easier to involuntarily commit
individuals to psychiatric facilities be abused? Such views, the
authors argue, may not be subject to empirical confirmation or
disconfirmation. 274
(3) Differences about the Interpretation of a Moral Rule: Individuals
may disagree about whether discontinuing life-preserving treatment,
such as artificial nutrition and hydration, counts as killing. 275
(4) Differences about the Scope of Morality: There may not be any way
to resolve disagreement about whether fetuses and higher mammals
are fully protected, partially protected, or not protected at all. 276
Disagreement does not, however, mean a lack of agreement on morally
acceptable boundaries. 277 Such boundaries are established by universally
accepted conceptions of harm. Note again the limited scope of such
agreement. The authors also argue that recognition of legitimate
disagreement can provide the precondition for individuals to "cooperate in
trying to discover a compromise that comes closest to satisfying both of their
positions."2 78 This conclusion reinforces the appropriateness of mediative
interventions in moral disagreements.
273 Id. at 55-57.
274 Id. at 57-58.
275 GERT ET AL., supra note 250, at 59.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 22.
278 Id. at 105.
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Claims of limited moral expertise, therefore, need not deny nonexperts'
ethical knowledge. Nonexperts live in the moral system which is prior to
moral theory. Ethical experts may be able to describe relevant moral rules
and ideals and discuss possible justifications for the violations of moral rules.
They can also identify reasons for unresolvable disagreement. They should
not, however, be expected to provide a single best answer to a complex or
controversial moral question. Consensus is likely to be restricted to actions
that clearly cause harm, without possible justification. Given the broad range
of possible actions, assisting in the development of consensus regarding a
specific course of action is nonetheless a significant accomplishment.
While the nature of moral expertise makes adjudicative ethics
consultation inappropriate, this problem is compounded in pediatrics by the
indeterminacy of the best interests standard. My discussion of Gert, Culver,
and Clouser's work should already suggest that this focus on the good is
problematic. 279
I now draw, in a similar way, on Robert H. Mnookin's analysis of child-
custody adjudication to elaborate why the best interests standard is a
problematic basis for third-party neutral decisionmaking in pediatrics. In this
article, Mnookin develops two major themes: that "the determination of what
is 'best' or 'least detrimental' for a particular child is usually indeterminate
and speculative," 280 and that "courts perform two very different functions in
the resolution of custody disputes: private-dispute-settlement and child-
protection." 281
Mnookin argues that child custody disputes resolved under the best-
interests-of-the-child standard differ from adjudication in a number of
ways. 282 Child custody disputes apply person-oriented, not act-oriented,
determination; they require individualized predictions of future events
(including the effect of the outcome of the process on the parties), not
determinations of past acts and facts; they accord limited relevance to
precedent and scope of appellate review; and because the child is not a true
participant, and, therefore, not all affected parties have a right to
participate. 283 This reinforces the disanalogy between ethics consultation and
adjudication.
279 See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
280 Mnookin, supra note 2, at 229.
281 Id.
282 Id. at 250.
283 Id. at 249-55.
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Drawing on decision theory, Mnookin identifies several reasons why the
best interest standard is indeterminate. 284 One is the difficulty of specifying
possible outcomes. For example, in juvenile court proceedings, the judge
may compare an existing family with an unknown alternative, because the
judge may be unaware of the characteristics of the foster family. 285 A second
is the inability to make confident predictions about the probability of the
various outcomes. Mnookin argues that the behavioral sciences are unable to
make the type of individualized predictions required by the best interest
standard. 286 The third is the lack of societal consensus regarding what is
"best." For example, what weight should be given to short-term versus long-
term consequences? Should happiness, spiritual and religious training,
economic productivity, warm interpersonal relations, disciple and self-
sacrifice, stability and security, or intellectual stimulation be prioritized? If
the appropriate normative standard is indeterminate, the third party's
decisionmaking capacity should be significantly constrained. 287
Mnookin contends that the indeterminate best-interests standard is
problematic for both of the court's functions, but proposes different solutions
in each case. 288 The child-protection function raises issues of the distribution
of power between the family and the state.289 Mnookin contends an
indeterminate standard is inappropriate for the child-protection domain
because it allocates too much responsibility to the state. 290 He proposes the
following standard for decisions to remove children from their homes as
more objective and determinative:
A state may remove a child from parental custody without parental
consent only if the state first proves: (a) there is an immediate and
substantial danger to the child's health; and (b) there are no reasonable
284 Id. at 255-57. But cf GERT ET AL., supra note 250, at 30-32 (criticizing
instrumental accounts of rationality).
285 See Mnookin, supra note 2, at 257-58.
286 Id. at 258.
287 Id. at 260-61.
288 Id. at 268, 282.
289 Id. at 265.
290 Id. at 268-69. See also Mnookin, supra note 2, at 269-72 (articulating additional
reasons, including indeterminate standards that invite judges' reliance on personal
values).
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means acceptable to the parents by which the state can protect the child's
health without removing the child from parental custody.
29 1
In contrast, while identifying potential benefits of more determinative
standards for the adjudication of private custody disputes, Mnookin argues
that none is preferable to the best interest standard. 292 He, therefore,
proposes negotiation and mediation as alternatives to adjudication. Judicial
intervention in such agreements would be constrained by the child-protection
standard .293.
Similarly, the best interests standard does not permit ethics consultants or
committees to function as arbitrators. The determinations that they must
make under this standard are inconsistent with adjudication. In addition, the
standard is indeterminate and prevents them from identifying or imposing a
single best outcome. Disagreements would commonly be within the domain
of private dispute settlement for which mediation is appropriate. One should,
therefore, adopt processes that are most likely to contribute to the
development of an agreement which is mutually acceptable to the parties.
Incorporating adjudication into a hybrid process does not remediate this
fundamental deficiency and has the potential of deforming the
communication process and impeding the development of a mediated
agreement.
Bioethics mediation so constructed has greatest affinity to family and
divorce mediation. Like ethics consultants, 294 family and divorce mediators
are required to have some specialized knowledge. In the case of divorce
mediators, this includes knowledge of family law, child development,
domestic abuse, and child abuse and neglect.295 Within the boundaries of
neutrality and party self-determination, the mediator may provide the parties
information which the mediator is qualified to give.296 Both the family and
divorce mediator and the pediatric ethics consultant promote a frequently
291 Id. at 278. But cf. MILLER, supra note 1, at 118-45 (arguing for the concept of
basic rather than best interests focusing on the primary goods of welfare, respect, and the
right to an open future).
292 Mnookin, supra note 2, at 282-87.
293 Id. at 287-89.
294 ASBH, supra note 10, at 16-21.
295 The Symposium on Standards of Practice, Model Standards of Practice for
Family and Divorce Mediation 2-3 [hereinafter Symposium Standards] (2000), available
at http://www.afccnet.org/pdfs/modelstandards.pdf, reprinted in 39 FAM. CT. REV. 121
(2000).
296 Symposium Standards, supra note 295, at 5.
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absent child's interests. 297 Family and divorce mediators are instructed to
suspend or terminate the mediation process if the parties are preparing to
enter into an unconscionable agreement. 298
This is not to suggest that mediation is a panacea. Mediation may fail,
either in the absence of an agreement or as the result of the mediator's
withdrawal. One might be concerned that the parent or guardian's proposed
course of action constitutes abuse or neglect. Evaluating this contention
would require a more adjudicatory process with a more restrictive standard of
evaluation. Such a standard should be similar to Gert, Culver, and Clouser's
focus on harm 299 or Mnookin's standard for decisions to remove a child from
parental custody. 3°° Given the potential consequences, due process
protections are necessary, even if the neutral's recommendations are not
binding.
297 Id. at 6-7.
298 Id. at 9.
299 See supra notes 261-63 and accompanying text.
300 See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
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